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This article argues that there is an alternative and hitherto unarticulated defence of necessity 
latent in the case law which could be a defence to murder. The defence can be formulated as 
follows: if a group of two or more people are virtually certain to suffer death imminently and 
together, from the same cause, but one or more could be saved only by killing a particular 
person in that group, then such killing would be lawful. (The killer does not have to be one of 
the group.) Formulating the defence this way also reveals its underlying justification: if all 
life is otherwise going to be lost anyway, it is better to save at least some of that life.  
This article begins by showing how this proposed defence of necessity is consistent 
with the leading cases and prominent real-life situations. It then differentiates the proposed 
defence from a defence of lesser evil necessity. 
 
Consistent with Howe 
 
Let us begin by considering the defence of duress by threats. An example of duress by 
threats, in circumstances broadly similar to the proposed defence of necessity, would be 
where A threatened to kill B unless B killed C. However, following R v Howe,1 duress by 
threats is no defence to murder. Nevertheless, the proposed defence of necessity, even 
available on a charge of murder, is compatible with that state of affairs. We can differentiate 
the two defences, even in circumstances where both relate to the defendant killing in order to 
avoid death.  
One familiar way of differentiating the defences is to say that, with duress, the 
defendant’s otherwise wrong act is deemed lawful in recognition of the pressure he was 
under, whereas the essence of a necessity plea is that the defendant did the right thing in all 
the circumstances. Or to put it another way, duress is an excuse, whereas necessity is a 
justification. This is not the approach advocated here, for the following reasons. 
Some authors question whether a theory which divides criminal defences into 
justifications and excuses is useful at all,2 or deny that it should be rigorously maintained.3 
Some authors question whether justification and excuse must be mutually exclusive 
categories, and which one is morally superior.4 Some authors deny that the categorization of a 
defence as a justification or as an excuse should have any practical consequences.5 Further, 
while duress is usually thought of as an excuse, there are some authors who suggest that 
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duress is a justification,6 and others who accept that duress might be a justification on some 
facts and an excuse on other facts.7 Some authors suggest that duress is neither a justification 
nor an excuse but occupies a third or middle ground.8 And while necessity is usually taken as 
a paradigm justification, still there are some authors who suggest that it might overlap with 
duress,9 or that on certain facts it too might be an excuse.10  
All told, there is too much controversy about theories of justification and excuse, and 
the place of duress and necessity therein, to make this a reliable basis for distinguishing 
between duress by threats being no defence to murder, and necessity being a defence to 
murder. 
There is an alternative way of differentiating duress by threats from necessity. With 
duress by threats, what happens in effect is that B seeks to transfer the risk of death onto C, 
when it originally applied only to him (at the hands of A). It is that transfer, perhaps, which 
caused Lord Hailsham to consider the person who kills under duress by threats to be 
cowardly.11 But with the proposed defence of necessity, the killer does not transfer any risk 
of death to the victim. Admittedly, he precipitates the victim’s death, but the victim was 
going to die soon anyway and imminently. The precipitation is lawful because it was the only 
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way that anyone could be saved. (We shall consider below the point that there must be a 
uniquely correct victim.) 
Thus duress by threats can be unavailable to murder, because it involves wrongfully 
transferring death from the killer to the victim, whereas necessity can be a defence of murder 
in circumstances where the victim was already going to die imminently anyway. 
 
Consistent with Dudley and Stephens 
 
In R v Dudley and Stephens,12 four sailors were cast adrift without food or water or prospects 
of a timely rescue. To stay alive, two sailors killed and ate the cabin boy. They survived and 
were later rescued and convicted of murder.  
 The case is often taken as supportive of the broad proposition that necessity is no 
defence to murder. But some authors have sought to confine it to its own facts, suggesting 
that on other facts a defence of necessity might still be open.13 Indeed, the case of Re A 
(discussed below) can be taken as supportive of the proposition that necessity can be a 
defence to murder after all. So let us put broad proposition to one side, and look at the detail 
of Dudley and Stephens. The proposed defence of necessity is consistent both with the 
outcome of that case, and with much of its reasoning. 
Three themes appear in the judgment of Lord Coleridge CJ. First, he said that the 
balance of learned opinion was against necessity as a defence to murder. Second, to allow the 
defence in such a case would mark an absolute divorce of law from morality. Assuming that 
both of those points were true in 1884 on the facts of that case, which included cannibalism, 
nevertheless implicit in both points is the possibility that attitudes can change over time and 
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circumstances, and the availability of the defence likewise. Once again, we shall see this 
proved true when we discuss Re A below.  
The third theme in his judgment is a more enduring point of principle, and it was the 
problem of selecting the victim: why kill the cabin boy rather than another sailor, or why not 
sacrifice oneself?14 Yet the proposed defence of necessity already addresses this question: it 
is only lawful to kill the victim if killing none other than the victim was the only way of 
saving any life among the group threatened with death. And this is also why the outcome of 
Dudley and Stephens is compatible with the proposed defence of necessity. In Dudley and 
Stephens, life could have been saved by killing any of the four sailors. The death of no 
particular person was the unique solution to saving life. Killing the cabin boy was not the 
only possible option. Hence the proposed defence would not have been available, and the 
outcome (conviction for murder) is supported. 
This requirement, that there be a uniquely correct victim, can be justified: if any three 
in the group of four could be saved by killing any one, then the law will not cast its protection 
over whomever happens to be strongest or sneakiest. The right to life is not so easily 
overcome. In order to rely on a defence of necessity to something as serious as killing, the 
parties must show that there was simply no other way.  
So what should happen if there are alternatives? The court in Dudley and Stephens 
was against the idea of drawing lots, for example.15 Presumably the trouble with drawing lots 
is that the loser can still withdraw his consent to being killed – and consent is no defence to 
murder anyway. But in other situations, consent might preclude the act of murder. For 
example, if there are four people but only enough food or water or medicine or life jackets or 
parachutes for three, the allocation of those necessaries could potentially be resolved 
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consensually, even though it means one person will die. Such situations need not involve 
murder; it could be that the ‘victim’ simply accepts his death, not at the hands of another 
person, but through the agency of whatever danger they all faced, while allowing the others 
to effect their escape.  
Having said this, we could make a bolder claim, and set Dudley and Stephens aside as 
wrongly decided. Then the defence might be available even when there are several ways of 
saving life. The defence might be available only if the defendant chose the alternative which 
maximized the saving of life. Or perhaps the defence might be available whether or not the 
defendant made the best possible choice. All this would require a more robust acceptance that 
in nasty situations unpleasant events can play out along lines which are morally arbitrary (eg 
according to the luck or strength of those involved). It would ensure that some life is saved 
when otherwise all life would have been lost. But it would remain a defence of last resort, 
when there is no other ‘fair’ way of identifying the victim (eg through consent). 
But we do not need to go this far. We can take Dudley and Stephens as correctly 
decided, and that is reflected in the proposed defence of necessity by requiring that the killing 
of the actual victim was the sole way in which any life could have been saved. 
 
Consistent with Re A 
 
In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation),16 a hospital sought a declaration 
that it would be lawful to perform an operation to separate conjoined twins too young to 
consent and contrary to the wishes of the parents. Without the operation both twins would die 
very young. With the operation, the stronger twin would probably survive, but the weaker 
twin would certainly die. The Court of Appeal considered whether a doctor performing the 
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operation would be guilty of murdering the weaker twin. The court declared the operation 
lawful. (And the stronger twin has survived to this day.17)  
The three judges arrived at the same decision principally through three different 
routes.  
Ward LJ identified the main issues in the appeal as ascertaining what would be in the 
best interests of each twin and determining how to balance any conflict of interests.18 He 
decided that the operation was in the best interests of the stronger twin but not in the best 
interests of the weaker twin.19 He said that the court could not simply refuse to resolve that 
conflict, but must instead choose the course of action which represents the lesser of two 
evils.20 He concluded that, as a matter of family law, the balance tipped in favour of the 
stronger twin because the operation gave her the prospect of a greater quality of life (whereas 
presumably withholding the operation gave both twins only the prospect of a short life of 
much lesser quality).21 As a matter of criminal law, Ward LJ said that the hospital and the 
doctors also faced a conflict of duty, to operate for the benefit of the stronger twin and not to 
operate for the sake of the weaker twin.22 Faced with such an irreconcilable conflict, Ward LJ 
said that the law must also allow them a way out of the conflict, again by choosing the course 
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of action which represents the lesser evil.23 Note that this was not a defence of lesser evil 
necessity. Ward LJ said that choosing the lesser evil was the way of extricating oneself from 
a conflict of legal duties. He said nothing about choosing the lesser evil in circumstances of 
necessity more generally. 
A subsidiary ground for Ward LJ’s decision was that the doctors would be acting in 
defence of the stronger twin.24 He said that the weaker twin was killing the stronger twin by 
the demands of being conjoined so that the doctors could come to the defence of the stronger 
twin and perform the operation to save her life, even at the cost of the life of the weaker 
twin.25 Robert Walker LJ also referred to the possibility that the defence of the stronger twin 
might legitimize the operation, but his reference was brief and hesitant.26 
In his judgment, Robert Walker LJ said that the operation would be in the best 
interests of the weaker twin as well as the stronger twin because the operation would give the 
weaker twin bodily integrity and human dignity, and because, without the operation, the 
weaker twin’s short life would hold nothing for her except possible pain.27 (Brooke LJ also 
thought that the operation would benefit the weaker twin in as much as it would give her 
bodily integrity.28) Robert Walker LJ said that the death of the weaker twin would not amount 
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to murder because the death would result from the weaker twin’s own inability to sustain her 
life, and was not the purpose or intention of the surgery, which was to save the life of the 
stronger twin, and which was anyway in the best interests of both twins.29 He also said that he 
would be prepared to extend ‘necessity’ to cover the situation of choosing between 
conflicting legal duties.30 But the label of necessity is not really apposite, and was not used by 
Ward LJ; a better word would be ‘dilemma’. At any rate, because Robert Walker LJ thought 
the operation in the best interests of both twins, he thus had no need for any approach which 
sought to resolve conflicting legal duties. 
Brooke LJ’s principal conclusion that the operation was lawful was founded primarily 
upon the fact that the situation satisfied the test of necessity set out by Stephen in his book A 
Digest of the Criminal Law.31 Brooke LJ said that a defence is available for any act needed to 
avoid inevitable and irreparable evil, when no more is done than reasonably necessary for the 
purpose to be achieved, and the evil inflicted is not disproportionate to the evil avoided.32 
This is a defence of lesser evil necessity. 
There was thus no single ratio in Re A, and none of the approaches lends much 
support to the defence of necessity proposed in this article. The only real defence of necessity 
properly so called to be found in Re A was the defence of lesser evil necessity in the judgment 
of Brooke LJ, and we shall criticize that type of defence later in this article. But if all this 
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seems unpromising, nevertheless Re A turns out to be a significant source of support for the 
defence of necessity proposed here. 
First, the outcome of the case is perfectly consistent with the proposed defence of 
necessity. Both twins faced death together from the same danger of having been born 
conjoined. The only way to save either of their lives was by separating them, and that meant 
killing the weaker twin. Put another way, the weaker twin was the uniquely correct victim. 
This straightforward analysis should not be confused with other more misguided 
language to be found in Re A.  Brooke LJ said that the weaker twin was ‘self-designated’ for 
an early death because she was unable to support herself independently of her twin sister.33 In 
similar vein, Ward LJ described the weaker twin as ‘doomed’ and ‘designated’ for death.34 
But the language of self-designation is suggestive of consent, and consent is no defence to 
murder. It is also an unacceptable euphemism when used in the absence of consent, as on the 
facts of Re A. Even without the language of self-designation, simply saying that the weaker 
twin was (somehow objectively) designated for death or doomed or bound to die takes 
matters no further forward. Both twins were designated for death by the fact of being born 
conjoined. The fact that the weaker twin in Re A had insufficient organs to support herself is 
irrelevant in this context. This is because she had not been born a singleton but a conjoined 
twin supported by her sister. It is aberrant to argue that if the weaker twin had been born a 
singleton she would have died, thus it is acceptable to kill her by making her into a singleton. 
The correct analysis is more honest and simple. To repeat, both twins faced death 
from the same cause of having been born conjoined, and the only way to save either of them 
was to separate them and thus kill the weaker twin, who for that reason was the uniquely 
correct victim. 
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Second, not only was the outcome in Re A itself supportive of the proposed defence of 
necessity, there were two other real-life situations discussed in Re A which similarly support 
the proposed defence. One concerned the Zeebrugge ferry disaster.35 Dozens of people were 
on board a sinking ferry with the only escape route being a ladder whose use was blocked by 
another passenger frozen with fear. Eventually that passenger was thrown off, presumably to 
his death, and the others escaped. No prosecution followed – and that is consistent with a 
defence of necessity. All passengers faced the same threat of death from the rising waters and 
sinking ferry. The only way to save any life was by killing the person blocking the only 
means of escape. That victim would have been killed anyway and imminently by the rising 
waters too.36 
The other real-life situation was where two mountaineers were roped together, and 
one had fallen over the precipice, threatening to drag the other to his death.37 The higher 
mountaineer cut the rope and saved himself, while his companion fell.38 Again, both climbers 
faced the same danger, of falling to their deaths as a result of being roped together. The only 
plausible way of saving any life was by cutting the rope, which meant killing the lower 
mountaineer. Again, he was the uniquely correct victim. 
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We can add to these examples. One year after Re A was decided, terrorists flew planes 
into the World Trade Centre. In a similar attack, the defence of necessity would surely make 
it lawful to shoot down the plane.39 When the plane crashes into the building, all the 
passengers will die, and so too the people in the building, all in the same event. The only way 
to save any life is to shoot down the plane, killing the passengers who would have died 
anyway, but thereby safeguarding those people in the building.  
Thus the outcome in Re A, and the real-life examples it discusses, all support the 
formulation of a defence of necessity to murder as proposed in this article. 
One final point to discuss here is the further requirement in the proposed defence that 
the parties involved must face virtually certain death imminently. This makes it clear that the 
defence is only available as a last resort, and not when there is time and the possibility of 
taking alternative action which does not involve killing. Again, this keeps the defence of 
necessity in line with the courts’ current thinking about the defence of duress by threats, 
which equally must involve a threat due to be carried out immediately or almost 
immediately.40 This requirement seems easily satisfied in the case of the Zeebrugge 
passengers and the mountain climbers. There was a question in Dudley and Stephens whether 
it was necessary to kill the cabin boy at that point, rather than wait longer for rescue,41 which 
might further support the outcome of that case. As for Re A, death was certain to come as a 
result of the twins being conjoined, but it still might have been months, perhaps years, 
away.42 Nevertheless, if it can be said with certainty that the only way to save life is by acting 
now, though death is not otherwise an immediate threat, the defence should still be available. 
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The defence would miss its purpose if it made the actors forego the one chance to save life in 
favour of waiting too late until death was upon them. 
 
Not a defence of lesser evil necessity 
 
The defence of necessity proposed here is not a defence of lesser evil necessity of the type 
envisaged by Brooke LJ in Re A. Yes, at a higher level of generality we might say that it is a 
lesser evil that someone is killed prematurely to ensure that some life at least is saved; but the 
lesser evil defence is problematic precisely because of its generality, whereas the detailed 
requirements of the defence of necessity proposed here avoid such problems. 
For a start, lesser evil necessity, as formulated by Brooke LJ, would support a 
different outcome in Dudley and Stephens, and it could also render duress by threats a 
defence to killing (eg where the lives of two people are threatened unless they kill one 
person). Yet that is incompatible with the law as it currently stands.  
Lesser evil necessity would also allow a defendant to transfer the risk of death onto an 
innocent victim. This is a consequence of the defence of lesser evil necessity being framed in 
utilitarian terms: it purports to accept the possibility that all interests are commensurable, and 
that anything goes so long as the end result is somehow in credit. Thus it rides roughshod 
over individual people and legal rights. To borrow examples from Simester et al, a defence of 
lesser evil necessity could justify stealing from the victim to give the money to a third party 
for a life-saving operation, or forcing a person with a rare blood group to make a donation to 
save another’s life.43  
In contrast, the proposed defence of necessity would not avail in these latter 
circumstances. The proposed defence does not allow one person to transfer the risk of death 
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onto an innocent third party. First, the victim must be virtually certain of dying imminently 
anyway. Second, the death of the victim must save the lives of others imperilled by the same 
cause. It requires the victim and those who benefit from the killing to be ‘in the same boat’. 
The proposed defence of necessity only applies within one disaster; it does not allow one 
situation to be traded off against another. It is not simply about maximizing life, broadly 
stated, but about maximizing survival in one crisis. 
 A related issue with a defence of lesser evil necessity is what Gardner called ‘the 
democracy problem’.44 It involves a balancing between competing interests which the courts 
are not well suited to undertake, as the following examples show. 
In R v Jones the defendants committed criminal damage at a military base in an 
attempt to hinder the war in Iraq. They sought to rely upon a defence of necessity (among 
others). On a preliminary issue, the Court of Appeal accepted that the defence might be 
available in principle.45 But if necessity were to mean lesser evil necessity, how could such a 
defence ever be administered in such a case? Was the war in Iraq a good thing or a bad thing, 
and for whom, and over what time period? How could a court determine such questions, 
given the limited time and resources available to it, and especially while the war is on-
going?46 
In Monsanto v Tilly,47 the defendants pulled up the claimant’s genetically modified 
crops grown under licence from the Department of the Environment. The defendants said 
they were acting to protect the public interest against the dangers of genetically modified 
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crops, including potential harm to people generally. The defendants relied upon a defence of 
necessity. Again, if that were to mean lesser evil necessity, how could it ever be administered 
in such a case? Is genetically modified food a good thing or a bad thing, and for whom, and 
over what period, and according to what reckoning? The Court of Appeal made it clear that it 
was structurally incapable of resolving such issues itself, in the limited context of adversarial 
proceedings between private parties. It also said that such questions concerning the possible 
risks and rewards of genetically modified crops involved matters of state policy and political 
judgment which went beyond the constitutional limits of the court. All this called for the sort 
of wide-ranging inquiry and policy debate best suited structurally and constitutionally to the 
democratically elected legislature. 
One response to the ‘democracy problem’ is to propose a rights-based theory of 
necessity, which would allow a defendant to act in order to vindicate a legal right by violating 
only a lesser right.48 Gardner gives the example of taking another person’s coat (thereby 
violating a property right) in order to save a child from drowning (so furthering that child’s 
right to life).49 He says that a rights-based approach avoids the democracy problem of the 
courts weighing up the balance of utility or welfare, which he says is what the legislature 
should be doing. Instead, he says that the courts would concern themselves only with rights 
already legally recognized.  
If Gardner’s example seems compelling, it is because it is already covered by a 
defence of duress of circumstances. That aside, how are rights to be ranked? Could someone 
be killed or harmed in order to protect important property? Could someone be harmed in 
order to further another’s right to life? Could lesser evil necessity justify forced blood 
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transfusions or forced kidney transplants from unwilling donors to save a patient’s life?50 
And what about rights which rank equally? One life could not be sacrificed to save more lives 
because the interest advanced (the right to life, rather than the lives themselves) is no greater 
than the interest sacrificed.51 Yet then it would follow that lesser property could not be 
sacrificed to preserve more important property, or minor personal injury could not be 
inflicted to prevent major personal injury, both of which seem counter-intuitive. Also, as 
Wilson has pointed out, all this ignores the fact that sometimes less harm is done by 
sacrificing the superior interest.52 And where do other rights fit in, like the right to liberty, or 
the right to privacy, or the right to freedom of conscience? Are all rights commensurable and 
capable of assuming a unique slot in a hierarchy of rights? Who is to undertake this ranking? 
If it is democratically unaccountable judges, the same constitutional objections arise. 
None of this is a problem for the defence of necessity proposed here. There are no 
rights to be ranked; it is only about saving some life when otherwise all life will be lost. 
There is no question of weighing up one person’s interests against another; the victim would 
have died imminently anyway, and although their death was precipitated, it was their death 
alone, and no-one else’s, which could have produced any net saving of life. Again, there is no 
question of transferring the risk of death from one person to another, because the soon-to-die 
victim and those who benefit from the killing all face the same danger together. Beyond the 
simple but powerful proposition that it is better to save some life rather than lose all life, there 
is no further room for discretion or value-judgments. 
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Conclusion 
 
If a group of two or more people are virtually certain to suffer death imminently and together, 
from the same cause, but one or more could be saved only by killing a particular person in 
that group, then such killing would be lawful. (The killer does not have to be one of the 
group.) This defence of necessity is supported by the outcomes of the leading cases, and it is 
consistent with the real-life situations discussed in the cases and literature. Its underlying 
justification is simple but powerful: if all life is otherwise going to be lost anyway, it is better 
to save at least some of that life. It does not involve transferring the risk of death onto another 
person, unlike with duress by threats, because the victim must be virtually certain of dying 
imminently anyway. It does not involve the perilous weighing up of competing interests, 
unlike with lesser evil necessity, because both the victim and the people who benefit from the 
killing must be ‘in the same boat’, facing death together from the same cause, and with the 
victim being the only person whose death can result in any net saving of life. It is not a broad 
brush defence of uncertain scope, but a narrow and focused defence which yet provides the 
best rationale for viewing the case law coherently. 
